Islamic Barbie: The Politics of Gender and Performativity by Yaqin, Amina
© 2007 Berg. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Fashion Theory: 
The Journal of Dress Body & Culture on 01 Apr 2007, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.2752/136270407X202736 
 
Accepted version downloaded from: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/3936/  
 
 
ISLAMIC BARBIE: THE POLITICS OF GENDER AND 
PERFORMATIVITY 
Amina Yaqin 
This article examines the refashioning of a gendered Muslim identity that is taking 
place around the iconic fashion accessory of a lifestyle doll amongst young Muslim 
girls. The doll named Razanne has been created and marketed by a Muslim couple in 
the United States and is sold primarily through their internet website, Noorart. 
Razanne with her visibly Muslim accessories of a hijab, jilbab and prayer rug has 
captured the imagination of Muslim parents who wish to provide their children with 
suitable role models in the ‘western world’. It can be argued that she has come to 
normalise Muslim identity through the lens of fashion. Bearing a strong resemblance 
to Mattel’s Barbie, Razanne signifies a new fashion trend amongst a global Muslim 
community which has increasingly come under pressure in the international war on 
terror. The Muslim company’s marketing strategy around Razanne relies on their 
toned down mimicry of a recognizable branded product such as Barbie. Thus Razanne 
embodies the modest Muslim woman who retains her cultural values while living in 
the west. With an estimated potential market of eight million Muslims in North 
America, the consumer ethic of brand buying has been utilised by a diasporic and 
ethnically diverse Muslim community to capture a niche market of both ethnic 
minority and Muslim buyers. Claims have been made that companies such as Noorart 
have received an unexpected boost after the events of 9/11 from buyers who are 
increasingly at odds with American foreign policy and wish to dissociate themselves 
economically from the imperial retribution that has followed in the wake of the events 
of September 11. A report by the Chicago branch of Reuters has argued that Muslim 
  
Americans feeling the pressures of a renewed nationalism hinged around the notion of 
a ‘clash of civilizations’ between Islam and the West, have turned toward Muslim-
branded products as a way of asserting their identity in the face of a narrowing view 
of their community.i 
The popularity of Muslim-branded products is not limited to North American 
consumers. Similar trends are taking place across the Middle East and Europe. 
Significantly, there have been a variety of Muslim dolls in the Middle East market 
ranging from the national Iranian twin duo of Dara and Sara to the Syrian Fulla. Dara 
and Sara were introduced to the Iranian market in 2002 as an attempt to curtail the 
popularity of Barbie and Ken. Developed and marketed by the Institute for the 
Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults in consultation with the 
Ministry of Education, the dolls are supposed to be 8 years old siblings. They wear 
modest clothes representing traditional values and Sara has a white scarf covering her 
hair. According to an Iranian toy seller Masoumeh Rahimi, the dolls are an important 
addition to the market as they are representative of Iranian values and a much-needed 
intervention against the ‘wanton’ Barbie who she believes to be ‘more harmful than 
an American missile’.ii  Fulla on the other hand has a similar body type to that of 
Barbie and an equally expansive wardrobe. The most noticeable difference between 
Barbie and Fulla is that of clothing, lifestyle and hair colour. The dark haired Fulla 
wears a full-length black abaya, which covers her from head to toe when she is 
outdoors, has a wide selection of head scarves and most significantly does not have a 
boyfriend. For the manager of a toy outlet in Damascus, Mohammed Sabbagh, ‘Fulla 
is one of us. She’s my sister, she’s my mother, she’s my wife. She’s all the traditional 
things of Syria and the Middle East’.iii  
  
In Great Britain there has been a considerable degree of interest from the press 
in the transnational Razanne and Fulla dolls since their arrival in the market. They 
have been reported both in the national broadsheets and tabloids. Ranging from The 
Guardian’s ‘Islamic Barbie’ to The Daily Star’s ‘Burkha Barbie’ both Razanne and 
Fulla feed into the public imagination of Muslim stereotypes reconfirming the popular 
perception that Muslim values cannot be integrated with the demands of modernity. 
 The matter of Muslim women’s dress itself has been a topic of public 
controversy in England since 2002 when Shabina Begum, a 13 year old British 
Muslim girl was suspended from school for continuing to wear a jilbab and ignoring 
the school uniform code.iv Shabina Begum stopped going to school and initiated legal 
proceedings in court supported by her guardian and brother and advised by the 
Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir. According to Emma Tarlo, the political activism 
around the hijab/jilbab debate deployed by the radical Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir 
has allowed for a sartorial means of ‘rejecting and resisting “the West” from within 
the West.’ Hizb ut-Tahrir are an extreme example of an Islamist activist group that 
has  operated in Britain since 1986. They and are not in any way linked to the 
production of consumable dolls. But what they share in common with the creators of 
these transnational subjects is the fact that they are contributing to the production of a 
fixed  ‘visual stereotype’ forMuslim womenv and trying to make that stereotype a 
reality.  
(NB section on Muslims Britain CUT) 
REPRESENTATION, STEREOTYPE AND THE MEDIA 
Historically, television, radio, internet and the print media have all participated in the 
cultural act of the representation of the other. It can be argued that the new face of the 
transnational ‘other’ in the western media post 9/11 has been Muslim. This is not to 
  
say that Muslims have not been part of an orientalised discourse pre-9/11.vi However, 
the media reports that followed in the wake of 9/11 carried an ominous ring for 
Muslim communities worldwide. The stereotypes closed in. Depictions of Muslims 
crowding our television screens were – and still are – none other than those well-
loved staples of women in the ‘uniform’ of the veil, and rows of men prostrating 
themselves up and down in prayer.  
(A passage has been cut from here) 
A common feature in the various media manifestations mentioned above is the 
utilisation of the stereotype for purposes of representation of both the self and the 
other. Here to give you an example with regards to Islam the most familiar 
representation of the stereotype often takes place around the theme of female 
sexuality. The two well-known stereotypes which feed into this discourse have been 
discussed eloquently by Rana Kabbani in Myths of the Orient with reference to the 
cultural characterizations of Sheherazade from The Thousand and One Nights, and 
Haideh Moghissi who has critically analysed various stereotypical ‘orientalist’ and 
‘Islamist’ standpoints which have succeeded in normalising a particular perception of 
‘Muslim’ cultural practices with reference to women in western societies in her study 
on Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism.vii 
More broadly, in the context of the self of western modernity which often 
asserts itself in ways antithetical to the tenets of religious morality, there is an 
imposition of an ethical order which fails to reconcile itself with the split Muslim 
subject settled in a non-Muslim environment. In this situation, the minority Muslim 
community has often chosen to visibly normalise discursive religious practices in 
their everyday life to distinguish themselves from the other. Thus, as Muslims they 
have to perform Islam in western societies in order to normalise and universalise its 
  
teachings for both the self and the other. This takes the form of the wearing of certain 
forms of dress, the ritual of prayer five times a day and so on. These acts then become 
the markers by which Muslimness is identified in non-Muslim countries. In doing so 
there is an inevitable collusion with the formation of stereotypes.viii  
From a postcolonial perspective the most immediately familiar paradigm for 
understanding the stereotype is probably that constructed by Homi Bhabha in his 
essay, ‘The Other Question: stereotype, discrimination and the discourse of 
colonialism’. Influenced by Freud and Lacan he presents the stereotype as a dualistic 
structure expressing both fear of and desire for the Other. The stereotype, according to 
Bhabha, marked by the knowledge of what is ‘already known’ draws its ambivalence 
from the constant act of repetition therefore ‘the same old stories of the Negro’s 
animality, the Coolies inscrutability or the stupidity of the Irish must be told 
(compulsively) again and afresh’.ix Recently, Peter Morey has suggested that in order 
to locate the stereotype discursively it is useful to consider Bakhtin’s concept of 
dialogism.x This focuses our attention on the historicity of utterances in society and 
thus suggests how the stereotype can be understood in relation to the intersections of 
communications instead of as a point of fixed meaning. Taking on board Morey’s 
analytic viewpoint, I am interested in exploring that intertextual dialogic process 
which exists between the representation of Muslims as stereotypes and the 
deployment of some of these stereotypes by Muslim groups in order to re-present 
themselves. In adopting these stereotypes, such Muslims not only reinforce the 
stereotype imposed upon them by the west they also construct a stereotype of their 
own other, the secular liberal west through which a finite bounded notion of 
Muslimness can be delineated.xi Therefore to counter the dominant discourse of 
secularism which perceives religion as a deviance, some Muslim groups have initiated 
  
a counter-offensive to normalise aspects of Muslim identity for a transnational 
Ummah.  
For the purpose of this paper I wish to focus specifically on an isolated 
example of an ideological construction of Muslim minority identity which is taking 
place on the internet and how this identification perceives itself within a self-other 
binary which reinforces ideas of stereotype, normalisation and performativity for the 
Muslim Ummah versus the west. This reformulation of identity is foregrounded by 
the emergent discourse of a renewed nationalism in America and Britain intent on 
normalising the new imperial condition of democracy and free market economy. It is 
disrupted by a significant Muslim minority insistent on deploying the conditions of 
globalisation in order to manifest an alternative site of resistance and mobilise 
minority opinion against the norms of a western hegemony.  
Firstly, it is useful to think about the frame in which we construct the idea of 
the Muslim Ummah and the way it constructs itself in turn. Ummah is understood as a 
‘global Muslim community’ and has traditionally operated within the context of trade 
and travel networks.  As a general code of practice, the Islamic Ummah privileges the 
Quran and Sunnah and regulates conduct in accordance with the principles of Islam. It 
is not a national construct but it does have sympathetic overlaps with the territorial 
struggles of Arab nationalism.xii  
In recent times cyberspace has become the most current form of establishing 
or maintaining transnational Muslim networks. Miriam Cooke and Bruce Lawrence 
argue that the Internet ‘reveals a paradoxical aspect of the metaphorical function of 
networks: they are de-territorialised and gender inclusive even while remaining 
socially restricted in other ways’.xiii There are of course countless cyber Islamic 
networks which have emerged post 9/11 and it is not in the scope of this paper to 
  
present an overview.xiv I will instead explore the phenomenon of Razanne, the 
Muslim Barbie, sold by the Michigan based company Noorart, which markets Islamic 
education and toys for children amongst other consumable products on the internet. I 
propose to unpack the theme of representation and stereotype in relation to their most 
popular selling item, the Muslim Razanne doll, who it can be argued is a sterotype of 
a stereotype. While doing so, I am aware that Arab identity in America is itself 
subject to stereotyping and monologic representation by the mainstream media as it is 
in Britain.  Sally Howell has noted how Arabs in America ‘feel bruised by a media 
that seems interested only in portraying them as terrorists, oil-sheiks, sexpots or 
lechers’.  She also argues that Arabs in Detroit try to construct their own subjectivity 
by expressing ‘individual and group identities that lie beyond mainstream television 
channels, art galleries, and publishing houses’.xv 
 
CONSUMER CULTURE: Razanne as  PARODY (this is new heading) 
(first para cut out) 
With regards to Noorart it is worth considering that they rely on the culture of 
commodification to recreate their own subjectivity but I argue that in doing so they 
are  tied to a singular transnational culture of consumerism which creates new 
consumer subjects but still transports the values of an American lifestyle. In another 
context, Inderpal Grewal puts forward the inference that the multiple subjects of 
transnational consumerism are not ‘in opposition to either globalization or 
nationalism’. Grewal writing about economic liberalization in India and the 
phenomenon of the ‘traveling Barbie’, as exported by Mattel, points out that Barbie in 
a sari is ‘not an Indian or South Asian Barbie’ but ‘what Mattel calls the traditional 
Barbie’ who is essentially American in body but plays at being Indian through dress 
  
and performativity. ‘The doll suggests that difference, as homogenized national 
stereotype, could be recovered by multinational corporations, that the national could 
exist in this global economy’ (Grewal,  p.800).xvi But we have to question which 
nation is at the centre and whether the stereotype that is being fixed for the national 
imaginary is one of an ‘exotic’ ethnicity which merely reiterates the ‘normative power 
of the center’. Radha Hegde focuses on the ethnicity element within the multicultural 
packaging of Barbie arguing that ‘Barbie as ethnic spectacle demonstrates how a 
certain type of “Indianness” is created and promoted through the white female body 
of a plastic Barbie. Indianness is packaged as a newly improved product and sold as 
the Orientalist fantasy of white femininity’ (Hegde, p.131).xvii 
Barbie is a problematic icon for women as has been argued convincingly by Mary 
Rogers in her book on Barbie Culture.xviii As an iconic doll she represents fantasy, 
and the gendered female identity of a young white adult. She has no parents nor does 
she have any children of her own. Her family consists mainly of siblings of whom the 
most recognisable is Skipper and the rest are friends except her boyfriend Ken with 
whom she brokeup in 2004. Barbie and Ken who had been dating for 43 years have 
been replaced by the pairing of Barbie and Blaine her new Australian partner who is a 
surfer from Sydney. This is a sign of the new reconstruction of Barbie in order to 
rescue her sales from the doldrums. As consumers, we are not simply tied to Barbie 
the doll but also to her lifestyle.  
In order to understand the ideology behind Barbie and her lifestyle choices it 
is important to consider Mattel the company which has been instrumental in shaping 
the doll. Barbie became part of a global transcultural network and was referred to as a 
‘global power brand’ by the former Mattel president and CEO Jill Barad who played a 
major role in transforming her from a $320 million dollar domestic business to a $2 
  
billion dollar global brand.xix She is marketed in 140 countries and is linked to brand 
names from fashion designers such as Carolina Herrera to soft drink companies 
including Coca Cola. Barbie was introduced to the US domestic market in 1959 and 
was the brainchild of Ruth Handler, the wife of Elliot Handler, and co-founder of 
Mattel. Mrs Handler’s vision of Barbie was inspired during a shopping trip in 
Switzerland when she came across Lilli, a German doll based on a cartoon strip 
character and sold mostly to men as a sex object. Until that time Mrs Handler had 
been looking for such a toy for her children who preferred playing with adult dolls 
rather than the baby shaped ones which were available in the market. Through this act 
of cultural borrowing by Mrs Handler and later Mattel it is ironic that Barbie was 
transformed from one kind of fetish to another (Rogers 1999).   
Mary Rogers locates Barbie within the fashion industry as a mimetic construct 
which allows women to imagine themselves as ‘perpetually young and ephemerally 
ageless’ and essentially views Barbie’s identity as performative despite her fixed body 
plastic. She argues that Barbie’s assemblage of accessories points ‘to a self 
continuously in the making under shifting circumstances’.  
Barbie represents the sort of contemporary selfhood some see as embattled and others 
see as liberated.  … [She] represents the sort of interaction as well as the sort of 
selfhood ascendant in postindustrial societies with their commodity cultures.  … her 
identity hovers between two cultures, the modern and the postmodern (Rogers p.136).  
 
This commodification of dolls has also been recognised as a symbolic symptom by 
Ann Ducille and the argument extended to include a debate on multiculturalism and 
its failure to accommodate racial difference despite the promise of cultural diversity. 
Her critical reading is in response to Mattel’s targeting of the ethnic market in the 
early 1990s. Mattel’s packaging of racial difference in the ‘brown skinned’ Shani, 
  
‘honey coloured’ Asha and ‘deep mahogany’ Nichelle is merely a symptom she 
argues of the commodification of Afro-chic.xx   
The debate about Barbie’s suitability for a Muslim audience in particular was ignited 
in 2003 when the Saudi religious police declared ‘Barbie dolls a threat to morality, 
complaining that the revealing clothes of the “Jewish” toy already banned in the 
kingdom – are offensive to Islam’.xxi Even more interesting was the appearance of the 
Fulla doll in Kuwait, as mentioned earlier, who is a mimicry of Barbie but a veiled 
one. Most significantly she is a best-seller in Egypt and other Muslim countries. Since 
her launch her rising star has been faithfully recorded by publications in the US and 
UK. In one of the UK tabloids, The Daily Star she is captioned as ‘Burka Barbie: she 
puts fun into fundamentalism’ with an accompanying close up of Fulla’s face in full 
black Hijab.xxii The cover story itself is continued on page three and juxtaposed 
against the uncovered ‘free’ breasts of Annie the Page 3 girl are the demure and fully 
covered Fulla dolls with the accompanying caption ‘Burka Barbie can’t see Ken’. The 
underlying message being sent out to the readers is that of the incompatibility of 
liberal western values with ‘modest’ Arab values. 
While Razanne hasn’t enjoyed the same kind of tabloid publicity, she is the older 
version of Fulla and has come to represent the personification of Islam in the west for 
transcultural Muslim subjects. She was introduced to the children’s market on the 
internet since 1996 in the US. Her publicity campaign in the Middle East and the UK 
was launched in 2004. Prior to that she had only been marketed in the US, Canada, 
Singapore and Germany. This doll is the brainchild of an American couple Noor 
(Sherrie) and Ammar Saadeh. Her name is Razanne and she is, according to Noor, an 
alternative to the ‘overly sophisticated and skimpily dressed Barbie doll’. She is as Jo 
Tatchell in her review of the doll The Guardian has named her, the Islamic Barbie.xxiii 
  
She comes with a heavy dose of ideology as well. The website advertising the 
Razanne doll includes the usual informative descriptions of the doll as well as a text 
box highlighting the educational and play benefits which will be gained by children 
who will acquire her as a toy. Other than the universalising attribute of shaping 
interactive play, Razanne ‘builds Muslim identity and self-esteem, ‘Provides Islamic 
role model, Promotes Islamic behaviour’. She comes in various guises, there is an ‘in 
and out’ Razanne who dresses in the latest fashions including short skirts while at 
home but dons the jilbab coat and hijab when going out to signify her modesty. She is 
to quote the creator’s ‘more than just a fashion statement.’ She comes with her 
distinctive colouring book which gives us a day in the life of Razanne from daybreak 
to sunset. There is also Playday Razanne who demonstrates that Muslim girls can 
have fun in the playground as long as they dress modestly in a loose fitting jumper 
and scarf and Muslim Girl Scout Razanne. Continuing the range is a professional 
group of Razanne dolls including ‘Dr Razanne’ and ‘Teacher Razanne’ who reinforce 
the importance of education and religious piety in Islamic society as well as shattering 
the stereotype that Muslim women can’t have careers according to Ammar Saadeh.xxiv 
The most recent addition to the range has been that of the ethnic category in the 
Playday Razanne collection. These Razanne dolls wear ‘light and breezy two-piece 
sets’ or shalwar qamiz worn by Asian Muslim women. They epitomise ‘Fun-Time 
Razanne’. The information included with the doll explains that the shalwar qamiz is a 
modest dress which combats conditions of extreme heat. The three ethnic variations 
are: Caucasian, ‘Pakistani Indian’ and black as well as racial colourings ranging from, 
fair skin/fair hair, olive skin/dark hair to dark skin/dark hair. Questions have been 
raised about the possibility of a future Ahmad doll but so far the creative team have 
no plans of mimicking Barbie’s heterosexual matrix with Ken by introducing an 
  
Ahmad doll. In the words of the Razanne storymaker and creator, Noor, ‘it wouldn’t 
fit with Razanne to have a boyfriend’.xxv  It is not just the Muslims who are enjoying 
the benefits of Razanne because there have been various messages of support posted 
on the website message-board from non-Muslim friends and supporters mainly 
commenting on the pleasing modesty of Razanne in contrast to Barbie’s nakedness 
and immorality. Noor’s other half, Saadeh has emphasised the message behind the 
doll saying, ‘The main message we try to put forward through the doll is that what 
matters is what’s inside you, not how you look’.xxvi But the dilemma for the Islamic 
Barbie is that it does matter how she looks because she has to personify Islamic 
identity through role-play and religio-performativity as her story unfolds.  Saadeh in 
response to Mattel’s ethnic representations of the Moroccan Barbie and Leyla, a slave 
in the court of a Turkish sultan responds as follows, ‘It’s no surprise that they’d try to 
portray a Middle Eastern Barbie either as a belly dancer or a concubine’. Both dolls 
have not had very good sales figures and it is interesting to note Saadeh’s own 
acknowledgment that Razanne is a critical response to these kinds of stereotypes. 
However one of the key differences between Razanne and Barbie is that the Barbie is 
an extremely bendable toy doll while Razanne is not flexible at all.xxvii This 
significant difference quite clearly impacts on children’s experience of both dolls and 
while Muslim children may recognise themselves in Razanne their experience of the 
doll will not be the same as with the Barbie.  
In order to critically analyse the ideological implications of Razanne it is 
useful to consider Judith Butler’s theoretical approach toward gender in her influential 
study Gender Trouble. She examines the genealogies of gender in a Foucaultian 
sense, decentering any notions of a foundational discourse. She argues: 
 
  
Precisely because “female” no longer appears to be a stable notion, its 
meaning is as troubled and unfixed as “woman”, and because both terms gain 
their troubled significations only as relational terms, this inquiry takes as its 
focus gender and the relational analysis it suggests. (Butler 1990: xxix)xxviii 
 
This relational analysis includes the historical contextualization of the discursive 
elements which have contributed toward the formation of sexuality such as language 
discourses, psychoanalysis and the body. By illustrating the different constructions of 
gender, Butler is able to derive her conclusion of a ‘performative theory of gender’ in 
which: 
 
The subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated 
because signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of 
repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the 
production of substantializing effects. (Butler 1990:185) 
 
Hence gender identity is not predetermined but is enacted repetitively according to 
cultural practices. Butler goes on to propose a set of parodic practices within gender 
performativity which subvert the ‘categories of the body, sex, gender and sexuality’. 
Later reviewing her own work in Gender Trouble she has commented that her 
example of drag as a parodic practice is not meant to illustrate a liberatory 
perfomativity, instead she has included it to critique the ‘false naturalisation’ and 
‘unity’ of gender relations. Her point being that there is no original which exists so 
drag as a copy of a copy pushes the boundaries of representation.  
I wish to engage with this idea of gender performativity with regards to Barbie 
and Razanne. Barbie creates the stereotype of a white American blue-eyed blonde-
haired beauty who is the object of desire. She has a voluptuous body, her accessories 
are in tune with modern fashions and she imbibes a significant proportion of the 
luxurious comforts on offer in material society. Barbie is marked with desire. Razanne 
on the other hand has been described as possessing a pre-teen body and a sensible and 
modest attitude in contrast to Barbie’s frivolity. She too has accessories but they are 
  
predetermined by religious conformity or professional obligations. So Praying 
Razanne has a prayer rug, the schoolgirl has a backpack and books, the teacher, a cell 
phone, laptop, briefcase and sunglasses and so on. Barbie on the other hand has her 
own bubble bath amongst other things. Razanne’s responsibilities begin from sunrise 
when she gets up to say her Fajr prayers, during the day she has a sensible and modest 
dress code wearing her jilbab and hijab when she goes out. Her creator’s state that 
‘Razanne helps Muslim girls understand that in the home they can be the ultimate 
fashion statement’ on the condition that they dress modestly outside. In other words, 
Razanne is marked with the loss of that very desire which is cultivated by Barbie. 
Appropriating a modest universalising Muslim identity for children who grow up in 
western societies she is a parodic response to Barbie. She is the stereotype of a 
stereotype. The report on CNN.com plainly states that Razanne ‘the new girl on the 
block doesn’t give Barbie much of a run for her money. After all, Barbie is everything 
Razanne is not – curvaceous, flashy and loaded with sex appeal’.xxix I would argue 
that Razanne’s performative behaviour is an attempt to stabilise the meaning of 
‘Muslim woman’ and set it firmly within the foundational discourse of Islam. Here 
there is also an important link to be made with anti-colonial sentiment and nationalist 
movements. Also interesting to note is the sexualisation of Razanne and Barbie. In 
contrast to Barbie, Razanne comes equipped with sensible white underpants which 
cover her reproductive organs while Barbie’s sexuality is fetishised through her amply 
proportioned breasts.   
 Various scholars working on nationalism have illustrated the ways in which 
women are appropriated as symbols of identity and differentiation in the struggle 
toward liberation. One such scholar, Valerie Moghadam in her overview of the gender 
dynamics of nationalism, revolution, and Islamization has remarked that nationalist 
  
struggles tend to make motherhood sacred and categorise cultural identity as an 
expression of women’s role and status. In Islamist movements gender politics take a 
central role and women become the carriers of tradition and an ‘authentic’ Islamic 
identity. They represent the structures of the family, the home and religious ideals.xxx 
  It can be argued that Razanne presents a counter-hegemonic move against the 
hegemony of a multi-national brand such as Mattel’s Barbie. Similar trends have been 
seen with the growing trend in the marketing of Islamic brand names giving us 
products such as Mecca Cola, Qibla cola, Ummah chocolate which compete alongside 
Coca-cola and Cadbury’s. 
 The web-based company Noorart who have launched Razanne represent a 
clearly articulated educational subversion of the norms of American society utilising 
the internet as a space of alterity. They are tapping into the lucrative market of 
children’s toys with a thoughtful parodic response to products such as dolls, 
children’s books, nursery rhymes etcetra which have particularly troubled their 
upbringing of children especially girls in western societies. So their Razanne is indeed 
‘more than just a fashion statement’. She represents a way of life.  
Noorart represents a key moment in the shifting of attitudes amongst the 
migrant Muslim community settled in America. They are no longer content to sit back 
and be stereotyped and marginalised. Instead they have embarked on their own 
project of self-representation with the potential of universalising an Islamic code of 
behaviour amongst young Muslim children.xxxi Historically, Islam has differed widely 
in accordance with cultural codes in different regions and traditionally madrassah’s 
have been used to generate a politicised universal Islamic code of ethics amongst 
Muslim men, for example the Jamat-e Islami is one such institution. What is 
interesting about Noorart is that they have used the medium of the internet to spread a 
  
globalising image of young Muslim girls which is in direct response to the dress codes 
of the dominant self in western countries. This Muslim self participates in a liberal 
lifestyle but does so by ring fencing a modest and Islamic lifestyle beginning with 
early years education. The hijab and the jilbab are thus normalised as key components 
of Muslim identity for children from the age of three years.  The fashioning of a 
gendered dress code is not done in isolation as they also engage in a dialogic pattern 
of familiarisation through story-telling. For instance, their website offers heroic tales 
such as ‘The Swirling Hijab’, in which the hijab ranges from a flying carpet to a 
sword building on influences from the Thousand and One Nights; the everyday 
‘Meat-Eating Vegetarian’, a story focussing on the dilemmas faced by young children 
while adhering to a halal meat diet in a predominantly non-Muslim environment; as 
well as re-appropriations of familiar nursery rhymes such as ‘Twinkle Twinkle little 
star’ including references to God up above in order to shape a culturally aware new 
Muslim identity.  
  Razanne is marketed as a fashion trend which competes alongside Barbie and 
Bratz dolls. She sports the latest fashions at home in the domestic sphere and dons her 
outer-wear for public life. She conforms to the public/private dichotomy which has 
been commented on in Muslim reform movements but the ambiguity in her private 
sphere comes from her appropriation of the latest western fashion trends alongside the 
performativity of her ritual obligations as a Muslim.  Noorart thus offers an alternative 
conceptualisation of Muslim identity by engaging with current market trends and the 
centralised culture of commodification. 
 However, through the positioning of Razanne in response to the discourse of 
western secular femininity it is arguable whether Noorart actually manage to break 
out of the frame of representation through the stereotype, or whether that frame is 
  
merely reinforced through the universalising of a female Muslim subject. Women as 
always are made to carry the burden for an entire culture.  
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